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ABSTRACT
Currently the public is relegated to the electoral process, surveys and polls, and group
participation in order to voice their agenda preferences. Various literatures describe the
decreasing influence of the general public within the agenda-setting portion of the policymaking
process. This thesis assesses the agenda setting and public policy literatures in order to determine
how issues become part of the policy agenda, looks to the public opinion literature to determine
how capable the public is in being part of the policymaking process, and utilizes the deliberative
democracy literature to construct deliberations that make it possible to get the public involved
again in setting the agenda. A pre-test, post-test, treatment/control experimental method is used
to conduct this preliminary research design that provides a template for creating public agenda
preference deliberations. Participants are asked to rank their preferences concerning the national
government‟s agenda and discuss them in an open-issue deliberative setting designed to generate
a dialogue that doesn‟t require policy debate. Findings suggest that deliberations do cause
participants to significantly change their preferences. Those participants who display openness to
the deliberative process are especially likely to alter their preferences towards those issues
discussed by the deliberative group. Finally, this thesis analyzes the findings and lists the
benefits of creating agenda preference deliberations.
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INTRODUCTION
How can the public influence the political process in a way that is supportive of its
needs? Research in agenda-setting, public policy, and public opinion literature uncovers the lack
of public involvement in the agenda setting portion of the policymaking process. Shouldn‟t
people maintain a strong influence regarding what issues are being addressed within the
government? And does deliberative democracy offer an opportunity for this? By utilizing the
progress within deliberative democracy research, further experimentation should facilitate efforts
to overcome this decline in public involvement. Deliberative democracy looks to benefit the
public by providing another way of voicing public preferences once they have been
contemplated in open discussion. Yet current research and experimentation seems consumed
with the idea of the public deliberating about policy alternatives. It is the beginning of the
policymaking process, agenda-setting, that is often overlooked. The public deserves a better way
to voice their agenda preferences to policymakers, political campaigns, and the media. This
research will describe how this can be better accomplished.
To begin, an overview of the agenda-setting, public policy, and public opinion literatures
will assess the extent that the public is involved in the agenda-setting portion of the
policymaking process, as well as the reasons that they are uninvolved. Secondly, a look into the
benefits and boundaries of using deliberative democracy theory as a road map concludes that the
theory can, in fact, be used to provide the public with better opportunities. A theoretical
argument is then explored that explains the growing necessities of such involvement, and
research questions and hypotheses are generated that establish the guidelines for creating agenda
preference deliberations. Using these assertions, a pre-test, post-test experimental method is
established using strict guidelines that are generated from previous deliberative democracy
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research. This experiment serves as a preliminary example of how agenda preference
deliberations would work, and tests how well each hypothesis determines the success of the
overall experiment. Quantitative analysis considers each hypothesis in relation to the
experimental success. Moreover, some further qualitative analysis explains relevant findings
outside of the original hypotheses. The conclusion ties the current position of the public with
regards to the agenda process of policymaking to the benefits of utilizing agenda preference
deliberations as a further prescription to public involvement in the beginning of the
policymaking process.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Media and Policy Agenda
1972 was the banner year for the emergence of the agenda-setting theory. McCombs and
Shaw published their research which correlated public surveys with media content intensity. The
authors researched the 1968 presidential campaign, finding that issues that were important to
voters are the same issues that the media emphasizes. They concluded that the public relies on
media coverage to determine what issues are salient. This conclusion suggested that the media
tended to set public preferences concerning agenda items (at least during a political campaign).
The authors developed the theory of agenda-setting behind the proposition that it occurred when
extensive media attention to an issue enhanced its perceived importance within the public. Their
scope on the agenda contended that salient issues within the media were what became important
to the public.
Another publication with a similar take on agenda-setting involved an examination of
how an issue becomes part of the American political agenda (Cobb and Elder 1972).
Specifically, Cobb and Elder examined how issues expand onto the public stage by becoming
socially significant. They advised that the growing complexities of government, bureaucracy,
and policymaking were beginning to hinder the public‟s ability to involve itself in agendabuilding, and professional networks or issue-based organizations were beginning to press forth
their agendas.
Further research began to understand the public‟s role in this increasingly competitive
agenda setting market. McCombs and Jian-Hua Zhu specifically targeted the public‟s capacity,
diversity, and volatility with regards to being involved in the agenda-setting process for over
forty years (1954-1994), finding that increased levels in education over those four decades
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evidenced why agenda diversity and volatility went up within the public (1995). Whereas in the
past the public‟s concern largely remained with a few issues, they considered the change that was
occurring: “the public agenda has been transformed from an era where one or two overriding
issues dominated the current stage to where many voices compete for attention.”
The media of 1972 saw the public‟s reliance on a few large media sources, but the
evolution of media outlets due to the rise of communication technologies created a different
environment for pushing agendas onto the national stage. Considering this world of new media
and public opinion, Shaw and Hamm concluded that the media was becoming more
individualized and therefore national agendas are in danger of fragmenting (1997). They
predicted that the national media would begin to take a backseat (with regards to influencing the
public towards the agenda) to interest groups and other issue-specific invested sources. Such
groups were beginning to be the focal investigation of researchers who studied the process of
policy creation (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005); specifically how
policy began within the agenda setting process.
The media‟s role of informing the public about important government agendas seemed to
have drifted from being a purveyor of public opinion to a generator of public opinion. The public
has always followed the media in order to determine what issues are relevant. But, with the
emergence of more media sources and growth in the size of government bureaucracy, the
public‟s role in agenda-setting has become far more complex and asks for an understanding of
many more issues than forty years ago. Furthermore, the growth of government has placed a
burden on the media to cover what happens within each governmental system or process and
report back to the public. As we will see in the next section, government and group influences
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are having a growing effect on what and how agendas are portrayed within the media and
directed back to the public.
Agenda Setting within the Policymaking Process
In an ideal world the agenda setting process would not be as much of an exclusionary
portion of the policymaking process, but would instead offer viable opportunities for the general
public to express their preferences to the various government venues. Currently this process
seems to be heading in the wrong direction. Who actually sets the agenda is an important
research question that has been considered in the public policy literature as well. Of large
concern within these publications is the path of an issue from its initial stage of being added to
the agenda to its final stage of becoming policy.
The first seminal publication on public policy that gave large regard to this first stage of
agenda-setting came when John Kingdon found that the mass media impacted public opinion but
lacked influence on the government (1984). He further challenged previous models which
asserted that it was public opinion influencing the government‟s agenda. Kingdon‟s “garbage
can” model illustrated how government officials generated the agenda (or shifted attention away
from it) and influenced public opinion in support of their policy alternative directions: “These
officials may attempt to mobilize the public in support of their objectives, but on many occasions
they will choose not to. When they do mobilize expanded publics, furthermore, it may be more
in pursuit of a passage than for agenda setting” (71). Important in this quote was the
acknowledgement that government officials were more interested in gaining public support for
the passage of a policy rather than gaining public support for agenda items. Kingdon showed
how public officials used the media to relay public policy alternatives and gain support while
disregarding the public‟s say in what items should have been on the agenda.
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Kingdon also established that professional networks were beginning to scuffle over who
got what put on the agenda (or left off); he explored in-depth these less-visible forces who tried
to block or alter the agenda (1984). While elections and public opinion polls were visible means
of illuminating to government officials what the public‟s agenda preferences were, groups who
had direct means of communicating to these officials often greatly influenced policy decisions:
“With regard to agenda setting...government officials and other activists affect the agenda in the
mass public more than the other way around” (Kingdon 1984, 70). In the case of policymaking—
in which agenda-setting is the beginning step—the media‟s role has drifted away from informing
the government of the public‟s opinion on agendas, policies, and alternatives. Rather, the media
relays to the public policy alternatives pre-determined by policymakers and other networks.
Kingdon further influenced agenda and policy research by separating the policymaking
process into three streams: problem, policy, and politics. The first problem stream was
recognition of a problem and the resulting effort to get it onto the agenda; it was largely
controlled by elites. The policy stream concerned interest groups, bureaucrats, and experts‟
abilities to offer alternatives. The final stream, politics, involved the visibility of public opinion
and elections, and gaining support for policy alternatives. A concern of Kingdon‟s (and still
relevant today) was the lack of public involvement in the problem portion of the policymaking
process.
There was more literature that detailed why the public deserved a larger voice with regard
to the agenda-setting process of policymaking. Baumgartner and Jones analyzed ways in which
issues were pushed onto the agendas of government venues, and suggested that how those issues
were framed (by the relevant networks) determined whether they were accepted as important by
the policymakers within that venue (1993). Their findings were such that issues were being
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adapted to garner public attention and agenda acceptance after the issue had been accepted by a
policymaking venue.
Baumgartner and Jones‟s public policy model was also used to explain increased efforts
to control agendas by specialized groups and organizations. Policymakers relied heavily on
professional organizations to save them time and provide them with necessary information, and
this in turn leads to their influence over what is put on the agenda: “issues are less likely to
emerge on the public agenda where specialists have developed a powerful sub-government and
where they all agree on the best direction of government policy” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993,
43). In such agenda monopolies, the issue had been strictly defined, and increased public
concerns about such an issue were quickly framed as illegitimate contenders to the agenda. They
explained that within bureaucratic and policymaking subsystems, interest and lobby groups vied
to keep “policy monopolies” in their favor. Expert groups continued to dominate the policy
debate in governmental subsystems, keeping their “policy monopolies” out of harm‟s way, and
any policy alternative debate out of the public eye.
Baumgartner and Jones more recently investigated the agenda-setting process,
considering that “selective attention in individuals is agenda setting in politics” (2005, 18). In
other words, policymakers have only so much time and resources to decide what issues are added
to the agenda, or what issues should be debated while in office (or during campaigns). It is
because of this lack of time and resources that they must rely upon the information provided by
professional networks, organizations, and groups that serve not only as informational providers
but often as proponents of a specific policy alternative. Baumgartner and Jones‟s analysis
inferred that the influence of professional networks (as well as “selective attention”) were often
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the reasoning of policymakers for taking up or changing the policy agenda, irrespective of public
opinion.
Public Opinion and Information Processing
It is evident from the agenda-setting literature that public opinion is directly influenced
by the media. The media relays public policy alternative debate to the public to a much greater
degree than agenda alternatives. Should the public‟s sphere of information gathering and opinion
giving live principally in the policy alternative, decision-making segment of the policymaking
process? A look into the public opinion literature suggests that the public is hindered by three
factors when processing policy information: 1) they lack full information to make proper
decisions 2) they lack the resources or ability to compete for influence over policymakers 3) they
lack the desire to be involved in the policymaking process.
Firstly, Zaller suggested that people lacked many of the facts concerning issues to hold
educated policy positions: “[Political information] is unavoidably selective and unavoidably
enmeshed in stereotypical frames of reference that highlight only a portion of what is going on.
In consequence, the public opinion that exists on a given issue can rarely be considered a
straightforward response to „the facts‟ of the situation” (1992, 13-14). Zaller‟s examination into
the necessity of the public to rely heavily on elite information or cues through the media
concluded that—for reasons of motivation, knowledge, and time constraint—public opinion may
not be well suited to fully understand policy alternatives.
Secondly, while most citizens simply didn‟t have the capability, capacity, or desire to
gather the information about a policy alternative, they were often hindered by the same
inabilities when it came to participating and personally influencing government officials or
campaigns in order to address issues they deemed important:
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Many citizens lack the de facto ability to participate, especially in
more costly but more influential ways. Further, when they do
participate—either directly through the vote or indirectly through
opinion polls—low absolute and relative levels of information
lower the likelihood that this participation will accurately reflect
the individual, group, and collective interests of the public (Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996, 59-60).
This explained another overarching problem with using elections and opinion polls to address
public opinion concerning policy output—people were often incapable personally or as an
unorganized public to influence the government agenda in a way that fit their preferences.
Thirdly, there is literature concerned with the lack of the public‟s desire to be involved in
the policymaking process. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse contended that in a system the public
would consider ideal, they would leave the decision-making (policy) process to the officials or
experts, but would like to be “convinced that the political system deals with issues that are
relevant to some ordinary people” (2002, 225). At the same time: “The last thing people want is
to be more involved in political decision making” (2002, 1). This statement wasn‟t the most
optimistic view of the public taken from public opinion or deliberative democracy theorists, but
it did highlight some basic concerns about public involvement in the political process. Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse suggested that people don‟t like confrontation, and discussing policy
alternatives necessarily brought confrontation.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse‟s further take on this quandary was very insightful:
The theorists‟ problem is in thinking that forcing people to be
involved in the political process that the people perceive to be
irrelevant and biased would somehow have a beneficial effect—
that people would eventually be drawn in or that their participation
would lead them to conclude the process was fair and relevant. The
empirical evidence indicates this is not the case. Theorists are
putting the cart before the horse. Exposing people to a system they
believe is flawed will only add to their frustration. If people are
first convinced that the political system deals with issues that are
relevant to some ordinary people and does so in a way that is not
9

designed to benefit only politicians and special interests, then
people‟s natural affinity for conflict, taking sides, and all the rest
will kick in (2002, 225).
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse suggested that people don‟t want to concern themselves with the
daily hassles of career politicians. They just want to know what they are up to.
Overall, it can be inferred taken from the public opinion literature that a majority of
people do not have the capacity, resources, or desire to be involved in the policy alternatives
debate (or Kingdon‟s politics stage of policymaking). A possible solution may be in getting
people more involved in the policymaking process —establish better opportunities for the public
to become involved earlier in the policymaking process. Asking people what should be on the
government agenda asks far less and is less confrontational than asking for their opinion on
policy alternatives, and it just might lead to motivation because of their involvement in the
policymaking process from the beginning.
Alternative within Deliberative Democracy?
Deliberative democracy is one area of research that addresses the contention that the
public should have a greater voice in policymaking matters. Amy Guttman and Dennis
Thompson considered that deliberative democracy should be defined in such a way that the
public is given a deliberative role to “justify decisions in a process in which they give each other
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching
conclusions that are binding…” (2004, 7). This definition gives a burden to the public which,
when considering the public opinion literature, creates informational, capability, and
motivational standards that are difficult to untangle. Without an informed public (a public which
understands the varieties and intricacies of the overwhelming amount of policy alternatives), it
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isn‟t realistic to expect people to be motivated about policy outcome debate, especially when
they are not visibly involved in the agenda discussion.
Another offered definition of deliberation that restricted the public to making decisions
about policy alternatives came from John Gastil: “When people deliberate, they carefully
examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful
consideration of diverse points of view” (2008, 8). The restraints of this definition are such that
people are expected to “arrive at a well-reasoned solution” without being fully informed (or as
informed as policymakers and professional networks or experts who spend their careers
attending to policy).
Further literature calling for deliberative decisions or solutions went one step further,
informing that consensus changes the shape of deliberation from discriminatory to validating
(Barabas 2004). According to Barabas‟ analysis, when consensus was established all participants
changed their opinion in roughly the same direction. When consensus was not established,
participants with weakly-held opinions were easily persuaded, while participants with strong
opinions do not change their opinions or changed their opinion in the opposite direction. Such
deliberations requiring consensus based on deliberative discussion (argument and debate) surely
polarize virtually any group that includes participants with strongly-held but opposing opinions.
But, other scholars have suggested that deliberation inherently lacked mutual respect because of
glaring differences in persuasion, rhetoric, and rational thought (Sanders 1997). People who
speak less continued to do so, and those who dominated discussions continue to discard the
opinion of others. So, certain groups are disenfranchised, while others thrive in a deliberative
environment.
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It has been further considered that deliberating towards consensus generates group
instability (Knight and Johnson 1994). Knight and Johnson suggested that deliberations begin
with parameters around what is at stake, then proceed with rational argument: “The way to
possibly avoid instability, then, is to induce a shared understanding regarding the dimensions of
conflict. Democratic deliberation might help accomplish this by allowing relevant constituencies
to sort out, and hopefully reduce, the dimensions over which they disagree” (Knight and Johnson
1994, 282). It therefore seems prudent to begin deliberation with aspects of the discussion that
can be agreed upon, thus creating some middle ground for the deliberation. Although allowing
“relevant constituencies” an avenue to consolidate their arguments and persuade others could
foster some degree of the disagreement warned by Barabas and Saunders. Promoting opinions or
attitudes that express group similarities can go a long way towards a successful and beneficial
deliberation. Because of the inherent conflict that begins deliberation, consensus should not be
viewed as a mandatory or even achievable goal. Knight and Johnson‟s recommendation to begin
with agreeing parameters of what is at stake offers a good first step for deliberation.
The public is considered to be deficient when it comes to arguing over policy
alternatives, not only with regard to an informational (Zaller 1992) or motivational (Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse 2002) standpoint, but with regard to their ability to bring rational argument to the
table (Sanders 1997). People vary greatly in their capacity for rational argument. The public‟s
capacities for cognition, reason, logic and proper communication are subpar by most successful
deliberation theory standards (Rosenburg 2007). Rosenburg furthers states that, because of this
lack of reasoning skills, emotion and affect often regulate people‟s discourse during deliberation:
Consequently most people are unable to deliberate adequately. In
deliberation, they typically assert their preferences and rarely judge
or defend those preferences relative to a life plan or an overarching
conception of the good. When approaching others, they do not
12

appreciate possible differences in basic understanding or reasoning
and consequently they do not present their own views in a
sufficiently elaborated manner so that others can understand them.
In addition, they tend to view the different views that others
express as an obstruction or simply incorrect. Overall the
opportunity for discussion and argument is not viewed as
cooperative exercise leading to greater insight and mutual benefit,
but rather it is understood as a zero sum game (2007, 345-346).
This view of people‟s ability to deliberate effectively went beyond those informational and
motivational shortcomings; it addresses a basic psychological concern with people‟s rational and
rhetorical devices which vary greatly—creating unbalanced deliberative groups. Moreover, the
overall capacity of the public to deliberate effectively and according to the standards and
expectations of many deliberative democracy scholars is often viewed as insufficient.
There is one thing that can be expected of people—to have a higher degree of rational
understanding of the issues that are important to them personally (and for society overall), and
which of those issues should be priorities for the government. If most deliberations center on
policy alternative discussions, it has been asserted that this is not what the public desires nor is
capable of. Is there another form of public deliberation than that of debating over policy
alternatives? We have examined the policymaking process—with its beginning being agendasetting—and the state of public opinion in the earlier sections. Public deliberation concerning
what issues are important for the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process doesn‟t
overly burden people with unrealistic expectations of becoming informed and motivated about
the issue in order to rationalize and communicate effectively to others in order to come to some
policy consensus. At least for now, people are just ill-equipped to deliberate in this capacity. But,
there are several promising areas of deliberative democracy that provide a roadmap for
overcoming the predicaments aforementioned.
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There is definitely a great push in deliberative theory to account for the informational
shortcomings of the public. D. M. Ryfe offered a great perspective when describing
“mechanisms [that] seem to be particularly associated with successful deliberation” (2005, 6364). Specifically, regardless of the type of deliberation, (1) the process needs a set of rules to
abide by. Also, and with the emphasis of scholars such as Robert Goodin (2000), there is found a
belief that (2) deliberation should involve culture and personal experience when discussions are
framed. Ryfe characterized (3) a need for proper information and leadership when organizing
and producing the deliberation. Finally, (4) people must believe that the deliberative process has
valuable meaning in order to become motivated about the process. These recommendations
offered a good glimpse into what scholars now consider pertinent areas to develop in order for
deliberation theory to have a firm ground in our political system and throughout our public.
One thing noticeable in Ryfe‟s mechanisms of deliberation that veers from the Gutmann
and Thompson or Gastil definitions is that there was no requirement to come to some conclusive
answer about a problem or set of problems. In other words, Ryfe‟s basis for deliberation didn‟t
require people to come to some policy solution. Instead, Ryfe was concerned with using the
deliberative process to the public‟s advantage; so that the public could influence the political
process in a way that was supportive of its needs.
Ryfe suggested that organizers should “avoid an explicit linkage between deliberation
and policy making” (2005, 60). Furthermore, he offered that deliberation should serve as a
consulting process to government officials and not a definitive solution. These analyses brought
about through Ryfe‟s research suggested that deliberation should offer insight but not
alternatives. In other words, let people influence the questions being asked in government, but let
the better informed officials or experts debate the policy decisions that best suit the people.
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Deliberative democracy scholars should consider Ryfe‟s call for public deliberative bodies to
“avoid policy making” (2005, 65).
Deliberative democracy research is often concerned with outcomes that determine
successful deliberations, such as preference change. There has been belief that effective
deliberation brings discovery and change in participant preferences (Manin 1987, 351-352).
Offering that deliberation was legitimized not by some final act of group agreement or
consensus; it was within the deliberative process itself that individuals discover and rediscover
their preferences, and subsequently make alterations to them. In other words, individual
preference changes could offer some legitimacy to the act of deliberating. One concern with this
approach to deeming deliberations effective or legitimate is that change can infuse a rational,
communicative group as well as a divisive or easily persuaded group. Preference change in
deliberation should look for change because of valuable group interaction, rather than persuasion
by one or few participants.
Shifts in participant attitudes can be said to account for the overarching view that
deliberation be used as a tool for increasing the public‟s political sophistication. A Gastil and
Dillard study tested four individual-based variables and examined whether their deliberations
could be considered successful in creating political sophistication: “This study‟s emphasis [is] on
changes in schematic organization and attitude certainty rather than aggregate changes in
attitudes” (Gastil and Dillard 1999, 6-8). The authors were looking for a strengthening of
individual attitudes and ideology. It is instructive to examine individual changes as a result of
deliberation, but, strengthening attitudes and ideology should be closely monitored if it is to be
considered a prerequisite for a successful deliberation. Such a barometer for deliberation can
easily produce success when the individuals actually diverged their preferences (whereas change
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shifted in diverging directions). Deliberation should promote alternative viewpoints, tolerance,
and group discovery.
Another concern within the deliberative setting comes from David Dutwin, who asserted
that people who are more prone to speak in a deliberative setting have prior-constrained beliefs:
“Individuals with high levels of prior political conversation (it is inferred) have more crystallized
opinions ready and waiting to be vocalized” (2003, 258). This largely applies to Gastil and
Dillard‟s findings that deliberation produces constraint. If the people in a deliberative setting
willing to offer their opinions are only the ones who already have polarized or “constrained”
their opinions into a firm ideological stance, then we again find the deliberative process
troublesome. In such a deliberative situation, discussion would inevitably lead to either debate
between opposing constrained participants with alternative views or general agreement with the
opinion of one or more individuals who hold prior-constraints regarding the issue concerned. So,
if preference, attitude, or opinion change is to be used as a gauge for successful deliberation, then
it should be further examined as to whether that change is due to open group discussion or the
prevailing opinions of one or a few participants.
Fishkin’s Deliberative Poll Model
James Fishkin is one scholar who undertook an effort to reconcile those informational
shortcomings found within the public opinion literature (and still does today). Fishkin viewed
deliberation as discussion in which all participants are given an equal opportunity to offer and
defend their preferences in an effort to come to some conclusion or decision (1992, 1995).
Fishkin only required an effort towards some decision. He understood the tumultuous territory
that might be spawned when there was a requirement for consensus. One way in which Fishkin‟s
deliberative polls managed to stay away from outright debate exposing the attitude constraints of
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the participants was to not require any type of consensus as to policy answers. Instead, the
purpose of each deliberative group was to evaluate the issue given to them, and come up with
questions to ask experts and politicians. “We wanted to insulate the participants as much as
possible from the social pressures of reaching a consensus on the substance” (1995, 185). Such a
rule of deliberation has been shown to allow participants ease when expressing their opinions to
the group, as well as being open to other participant‟s opinions (Ryfe 2005; Fishkin 1992, 1995).
Fishkin attributed this lack of polarization to the absence of a verdict or consensus requirement.
Fishkin further argued that deliberation should be used to get the public more involved in
the political process and improve public awareness in those areas discussed in the public opinion
literature: informational shortcomings and lack of political efficacy (Fishkin 1992, 1995).
Fishkin considered deliberation a democratic reform that could answer some of the public‟s
deficiencies, and give the public a venue to express their preferences that was less influenced by
the media and government officials and a genuine expression of the public‟s preferences outside
of voting and opinion polls. He considered a deliberative venue to be a better way to
communicate to politicians and policymakers a truer, contemplated form of public opinion; this
was his reasoning for creating “deliberative polls” (1995).
Deliberative polls offered a good evaluation of Fishkin‟s efforts to use deliberation in
order to include the public in the process of policymaking. His model consisted of a predeliberation and post-deliberation survey which showed how the process of deliberating could
change (enlighten) the opinions of participants and further motivate participants and the public to
become and remain informed about politics. The deliberative meetings were in small groups of
about fifteen people which discussed policy on three issue points: economic policy, foreign
policy, and family issues. Participants were supplied in advance information packets concerning
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the specific issue they were to deliberate about. These deliberative polls served good purpose in
exploring what public opinion would be if people were informed and motivated enough to
contemplate specific policy questions.
Fishkin was apprehensive about some of the same concerns found in the agenda-setting
literature—that the media is a powerful influence over public opinion. Although Fishkin saw that
“the agenda of questions is likely to be set by the needs of the news cycle, not, in most cases, the
interests of the public,” his opportunity to reconcile this obstruction to the public was hindered
by his use of fixed issue topics (economics, foreign policy, and family issues) in his model
(1995, 156). While these issues may be of concern to many participants, others may have had
greater concerns of interest, or may have had little interest in one or more of these issues.
One finding Fishkin looked for in every deliberative poll was for preference change in the
participants. He found in a significant number of cases that the initial judgments revealed by
participants differed from their post-deliberation responses (2003). While he surmised that the
information provided was cause for much of this opinion change, he also allowed that the act of
deliberating itself could account for some of the change response.
Fishkin found further evidence stimulated by the act of deliberating together:
In cases with ranking questions, we have found a higher degree of
preference „structuration‟ making cycles less likely, after
deliberation compared with the views in initial questionnaires. In
other words, a higher percentage of the sample has single-peaked
preferences. Respondents may not agree on a single answer but
they agree on what they are agreeing—or disagreeing—about
(2003, 130).
Here Fishkin‟s findings showed that participants tended to agree on the importance of issues as a
result of the deliberation itself. But, these findings were only concerned with those pre-conceived
issue boundaries made beforehand (economic policy, foreign policy, family issues). By limiting
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preference rankings or responses to specific issues within the questionnaires, participants were
not totally open to contemplate all issues or agendas, and therefore it cannot be further inferred
that participants would retain this “preference structuration” post-deliberation if asked to rank
and deliberate upon an indefinite number of open-ended issues or agendas. Would a deliberation
about open-ended issues garner the same findings—that participants agree on the importance of
issues, and as a result change their preference rankings accordingly?
Whether Fishkin‟s choice of deliberative issues were examples of the issues the public
views as priorities for government policymaking or not, there were three results of Fishkin‟s
deliberative polls that lended promise to the public and deliberative democracy theory: (1) The
process of deliberation works to heighten the consideration and motivations of participants, as
permitted by the lack of consensus requirement and proven by the change in opinion postdeliberation. (2) “Deliberative citizens offer a useful contrast to the self-selected intense groups
and lobbyists who tend to dominate „town meetings‟ and similar open forums,” (3) Deliberative
polls provide a way for the public to voice their opinions about policy alternatives, but also
offers a great model for creating a deliberative venue for the public to openly voice their agenda
preferences (2003, 131).
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THEORY
What should be further explored within these various literatures and policymaking
research is whether it is of greater benefit to our democratic system to ask the public to give its
preferences on policy outcomes as they are being debated by elites, or whether it would be more
prudent to find ways to get the public involved in Kingdon‟s problem stream—determining the
priority of problems and determining when/if they should be put on the policy agenda.
Currently the American public‟s involvement in policymaking is such that they are
expected to remain attentive to alternatives produced from within the same system that limits
their involvement from the beginning; it overlooks their say regarding the agenda yet expects full
understanding of the policy alternatives at the end. Expecting people who are not career
politicians, experts, or even activists, to follow policy issues closely enough to make informed
decisions on the alternatives asks much more of the public than for them to become more
involved in deciding what issues will go onto the agenda. The current system seems illogical;
people often lack the information, motivation, and rational thought to come to conclusive
answers as to policy alternatives.
Admittedly, the public has some voice in the agenda, just as it does with policy decisions.
Largely, the public‟s voice with regard to policy decisions comes from their vote choice and
public opinion polls; both are seen as referendums on issues. But what is the source of the
public‟s voice in the arena of policy agenda-setting? Surveys and polls use pre-determined issues
and often frame questions in a manner that is a choice between one policy alternative or another.
Campaigns debate issues that are likely to stir voter interest, but can easily pick-and-choose
issues that are likely to gain voter support. The public can join organizations or groups that work
to push agendas onto the national scene, but these groups cannot be considered a proper
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representation of the unorganized public‟s agenda preferences; they are inclusive and push
forward their own interests. Should today‟s agenda process—ruled by experts and professional
networks as found in the policy literature—be considered proper gauges to the public‟s interests,
or should the general public be offered a better alternative for communicating its agenda
preferences?
What we are currently asking the public to do in the policymaking process is a demand at
is too high for many to pay, and results in the system we have today—politicians and
government officials who set the agenda; experts, interest groups, and professional networks who
create and push forward policy alternatives (or block agendas); a mass media who relays these
messages to the public; and a public who inputs what they believe to be their best alternatives
through voting and polls as if they were taking a multiple-choice quiz. Shouldn‟t the public first
be more involved in setting the agenda; then secondly allowing the policymakers, experts, and
research networks the ability to create policy alternatives, introduce policy debate, and generate
solutions using public opinion and voter referendum as a guide? Isn‟t asking for public
involvement in this second portion of the policymaking process exactly what the public opinion
literature expresses concern with?
While understanding policy alternatives may not be the public‟s strong point, there are
three beneficial reasons for giving the public increased initiative in determining what goes on the
agenda: (1) Informational costs aren‟t nearly as high. The public cannot be expected to take the
time to fully understand the costs and benefits of the many policy alternatives that concern
policymakers. (2) Public discourse should begin with something people are more capable of
addressing—their own agenda preferences—rather than determining policy alternatives. It has
been show that most within the public lack the rational capabilities to make proper
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considerations regarding policy alternatives (Sanders 1997). (3) The public may become more
supportive and attentive towards a process that they were directly involved in from the
beginning. It has been shown that the public lacks motivation with regards to being involved in
political debate and confrontation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Simply understanding and
prioritizing the problems that are out there doesn‟t create as much political turmoil (or
apprehension) as public debate concerning policy alternatives. Moreover, suppositions that the
public should be more in-tune with the policymaking process might have merit if the public
viewed their role in the agenda-setting portion as relevant.
What deliberative democracy research often fails to acknowledge is this earliest
policymaking stage in which the public should first be involved. The right of the public to
determine what issues are put on the agenda (and when) seems an intuitive and imperative
function of a proper democratic system. The American system is lacking in this case, especially
with the expansion of government agencies, bureaucracies, and professional networks. People
can easily rank what issues are most important to them or what they would prefer the
government to be treating as priorities; and this is without the unwanted involvement in political
conflict. Finding out what these issues are is a much lower cost to all involved, and could easily
serve policymakers and political campaigns when they determine what gets on the agenda.
Much of deliberative democracy continues to focus on creating ways for the public to
deliberate (debate) about their differences concerning policy alternatives. There are many
inherent problems (low information, low motivation, insufficient rational thought, discrepancies
in rhetoric, and emotional affect) that accompany deliberating towards policy alternatives. Such
deliberations rely on participants becoming motivated enough to learn about policy alternatives,
then gather in a confrontational environment that is not conducive to most people‟s rational
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thought and rhetorical capabilities. Deliberating strictly about what issues should be on the
government agenda largely leaves behind these difficulties.
From Theory to Experiment
The literature review and theory chapters describe the need for agenda preference
deliberations, and such an experiment should show how effective the changing boundaries of
such deliberations might be. The beginning reason for creating this preliminary experiment is to
establish the different rule requirements involved in agenda preference deliberations (as opposed
to policy alternative deliberations). Such deliberations can substantially leave behind a long list
of problematic concerns that easily arise within policy outcome deliberations: informational
requirements (Zaller 1992), motivational deficits (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002),
apprehension towards confrontation (Rosenburg 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), rational
and rhetorical capabilities (Sanders 1997), emotional affect (Rosenburg 2007), limitations of
consensus (Rosenburg 2007; Ryfe 2005), and divisiveness caused by debate (Knight and
Johnson 1994).
But, such rule changes can be offered without creating an experiment. The outcome of
this experiment serves specific purposes for the field of deliberative democracy beyond that of
simply providing a rejuvenating template and rules. It tests for evidence of a successful outcome
based on changes in individual participants. Proven success would give further reason to
replicate agenda preference deliberation experiments using the same (or a similar) model.
Evidence of success would warrant experiments using more generalizable pools of participants to
be examined in order to further verify the usefulness of such deliberations. Success would also
establish credibility for use of such agenda deliberations as their original purpose intends—to
inform policymakers, political campaigns, and the media of public preferences. Such
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deliberations could provide aggregate findings to any number of government levels (national,
state, local, etc.) based on participants‟ discussed and considered agenda preferences.
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EXPERIMENT
Design
The design used to test the first hypothesis is a random treatment/control group, pre-test,
post-test experiment. The design used to test the second and third hypotheses is a random single
group (treatment), pre-test, post-test design.
Sample
Individuals took part in the experiment at the Media Effects Laboratory located on the
campus of Louisiana State University. The experiment used a sample of ninety-six Louisiana
State University students who were recruited from introduction to political science classes and
given extra credit for their participation. A total of six treatment groups and six control groups
were compromised of forty-eight treatment and forty-eight control participants; there were a total
of twelve groups comprised of between five to ten participants (averaging eight participants per
group). Treatment groups received deliberation between pre-post tests, while the control groups
did not deliberate but received both pre and post-tests.
Procedures
Both treatment and control groups received the same pre-and post questionnaire.1 Control
groups were instructed to stop at a certain point in the experiment which concluded the pre-test,
during which they were given approximately an eight to ten minute break in which they were
asked to not speak about their responses. Control groups were then instructed to finish the posttest. Treatment groups were instructed to stop at the same point in the experiment, and then begin
a group discussion. Instructions were given that it was not necessary to speak, and that the
discussion was not meant to be a debate of issue sides or outcomes, but rather what issues should

1

Questionnaire is Appendix A
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be on the government‟s agenda (they were asked to discuss their agenda preference rankings
with the group).2 The moderator goals were to establish that no policy alternative or outcome
debates threatened the deliberation, that everyone had equal opportunity to speak, and to bring
the deliberation towards three areas concerning the participants agenda preferences: (1) were
there agendas that the group largely agreed should be priorities; (2) were there agenda
preferences of personal importance to participants; (3) were there “outlier” agenda preferences
that participants believed were being overlooked by either the government or the public. 3
Deliberations lasted an average of ten minutes.
Hypotheses
In order to test whether the experiment can be considered a success or not, several
questions should be considered. It has been suggested that change in participant‟s preferences or
opinions after deliberation is one signal that the deliberation has been a success (Fishkin 1995,
2003; Manin 1987). Therefore, it is prudent to first determine whether there is significant overall
change in participant preferences because of the act of deliberation itself. Expectations are to
find amounts of change within the treatment groups significantly beyond those findings from
control groups. Findings in this direction would offer the first step into supporting the
effectiveness of the experiment.
H1: Deliberating about agenda priorities will show that those who participated in
deliberations change their agenda preferences more-so than those who did not participate in
deliberations.
An analysis of variance model will be used to first test the effect of the independent
variable in question—condition—on the dependent variable—overall preference ranking

2
3

Participant instructions found in Appendix B
Moderator instructions found in Appendix B
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change. Secondly, an analysis of covariance model will likewise test the independent and
dependent variables while controlling for an alternative variable—discuss weekly.4
Participants were given open-ended agenda preference ranking responses in both the pre
and post-tests. They are used to determine the dependent variable as a scaled interval value. The
preference ranking question asks participants to list five agenda preference items in order of
importance.5 The dependent variable code is determined by assessing individual change in each
participant‟s agenda preference ranking. It is coded as an interval value and ranges from a
possible score of zero to thirty for each participant. This is determined by adding a score of 1
each time a preference changes a ranking position. 6 Furthermore, each time a preference was
added to or removed from the participant‟s ranking list that item received a score as if it were
ranked as number six in importance.7 These scores are totaled in order to determine the
dependent variable value of each participant.8
The independent variable condition is the causal variable, whereas the control condition
is coded with a nominal value of zero and the treatment condition has a nominal value of one.
Another alternative variable controlled for is discuss weekly, which represents a ratio of zero to

4

This second test is based on the Dutwin (2003) assertion that prior political discussion constrains preferences.
Question 1 in Appendix A
6
For example, if a participant ranked “economy” as #1 pre-treatment, then re-ranked “economy” #2 in the posttreatment/control list, this rank change would receive a score of 1 (to be added to the total change for that
participant).
7
For example, if a participant ranked “economy” as #1 pre-treatment, then failed to rank “economy” in the posttreatment/control list, this change would represent a score of 5 (as if “economy” were now #6 in the post-treatment
list)
8
A full example would be as such- If a participant ranked (pre-treatment/control):
#1 “economy” #2 “national security” #3 “education” #4 “health care” #5 “energy”;
then ranked (post-treatment/control):
#1 “national security” #2 “economy” #3 “education” #4 “environment” #5 “energy”;
the dependent variable score would represent: 1+1+2+1=5.
Plus one (for “economy” change #1 to #2), plus one (“national security” change #2 to #1), plus two (“health care”
change #4 to #6), and plus two (“environment” change #6 to #4).
5
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seven days, determined by participant‟s response to the question of how many days a participant
usually discussed politics with family or friends. 9
Looking deeper into the success of this experiment requires a second account of change
in participant‟s preferences, but based solely on whether deliberation incentivized participants to
change their preference in the direction of the issues that were specifically discussed during the
deliberation. Such an analysis will go beyond the previous question by determining the extent of
success as a result of the deliberation. Knight and Johnson (1994) warranted that debate and a
requirement for a consensus causes divisiveness, and therefore deliberation should first utilize
what the group finds in common. Because debate and consensus are not definitive aspects of
these deliberations, it should be found that group change will tend towards group cohesion
(rather than divisiveness). Furthermore, two moderator instructions consider similar group
preferences as well as personal experience, providing more promise of group cohesion. Findings
are expected to result in consistent preference change in the direction of the group discussed
topics.
H2: Participants involved in deliberation will rank the agenda preferences that were
discussed in deliberation increasingly more in their post-deliberation questionnaires than in
their pre-deliberation questionnaires.
An analysis of variance model will be used for H2 in order to determine any significant
increase in preference change when taken into account only issues discussed in deliberation.
To quantify this hypothesis, only those forty-eight participants involved in deliberations
were used as data sources. First, a list of preferences discussed within each of the six deliberative
groups verified whether each individual participant ranked any of those preferences in either the

9

Question 8 in Appendix A
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pre or post-test.10 Next, a scaled value similar to the H1 dependent variable was used to code the
change in participant‟s pre-deliberation ranking and post-deliberation rankings of issues
discussed during deliberation.11 The interval value represents the preference rankings that were
listed in the participant‟s pre-test and were also discussed in the group‟s deliberation—pre-test
value—as well as a second value that represents the preference rankings listed in the participant‟s
post-test and were discussed in the group‟s deliberation—post-test value. Although this is not a
cause/effect test, further utilizing a simple linear regression graph for this model shows the
direction and strength to which participants increasingly changed their preferences towards the
issues discussed in group deliberation.
Even with supporting findings, the first two hypotheses still would not adequately
describe a successful deliberation. While the groups may converge towards like-preferences,
final considerations should consider whether that convergence is due to group openness and
contemplation or a result of persuasion. This additional research question not only helps
determine the success of the deliberation, but can be used to determine if specific participants
are (or are not) likely to change their preference ranking from pre-test to post-test. It looks for
predictive verification that participants who are open to the deliberative process will change their
preferences according to what issues are discussed. Barabas suggested that participants with
weakly-held opinions are easily persuaded (2004). So, this question asks whether there is
statistical evidence that suggests that open-minded participants change their preferences more
(and to what extent) than participants with constrained preferences. In order to gauge this
change, each participant‟s response to a question concerning openness to the deliberative process

10

Amount of issues ranged from 4-10 per group.
Scaling on either pre or post-ranking list are valued from 0-15, whereas a ranking of #1 is scored 5, #2 is scored 4,
#3 is scored 3, #4 is scored 2, and #5 is scored 1. Therefore, an individual who ranked 5 issues which were all
discussed is coded a value of 15 (5+4+3+2+1=15).
11
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will support participant openness or constraint. Results are expected to show some significance
based on two factors. First, openness should show a higher tendency to change preferences.
Secondly, participants who are determined to have constrained preferences will be more likely to
persuade others towards their beliefs (Dutwin 2003). Finding any significant evidence of this will
dictate further analysis concerning group cohesiveness versus group persuasion.
H3: Based on a scaled response regarding how open participants were to the
deliberative process, an increased score suggesting openness to the deliberative process will
also show an increased amount of agenda preference change from the pre-deliberation
questionnaire to the post-deliberation questionnaire.
Two simple linear regression models will be used for H3 to determine whether there is a
linear relationship regarding: (1) overall preference ranking change and process openness (2)
deliberation preference ranking change and process openness. In both cases process openness
acts as the independent variable.12
Similar to the H2 model, the data only uses those forty-eight participants who took part in
deliberation. An initial test on the H1 model‟s dependent variable—overall preference ranking
change—is done in order to assess participants overall preference change when the process
openness independent variable is accounted for. A second test measures a new dependent
variable value—deliberated preference ranking change—created for the H3 model, which is
coded as the post-test value from the H2 model subtracted from the pre-test value used in H2
model. 13 The process openness variable accounts for how open participants were towards the
deliberative process. This variable quantifies participants‟ propensity to be open-minded during

12

Represented by Appendix A, post-test question 2
This variable resulted in scores ranging from -2 (meaning this participant decreased the ranking values of their
preferences away from what preferences were discussed in the deliberation) to 11 (meaning this participant
increased their preferences significantly according to those preferences discussed in the deliberation.
13
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the deliberative discussion and towards other participants‟ opinions; while lack of openness
towards the deliberative process shows participant constraint towards the deliberative process.
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ANALYSIS
Hypothesis 1
The first test of H1 describes overwhelming evidence in support of the hypothesis. This
model is first described in Table 1 using summary statistics. In Table 1 it is apparent that the two
groups (treatment and control) vary significantly when comparing the means of the dependent
variable on the independent variable. Treatment groups averaged preference change much
Table 1: Hypothesis 1 Summary Statistics
Condition

Mean*

Standard

95% Confidence

Deviation

Intervals

Control

3.15

3.35

2.17

to

4.12

Treatment

9.65

5.42

8.07

to

11.22

Total

6.40

4.39

*Mean difference is 6.5

more-so (9.65 value) than control groups (3.15 value). Also, the mean difference and confidence
intervals describe the large discrepancy in the groups. The standard deviation is understandably
higher in the treatment groups, based on the expectation from the hypothesis that treatment
groups will have a higher dependent variable value based on more overall preference change.
This standard deviation expresses the participant discrepancies on the dependent variable as well.
For instance, many control participants didn‟t change their preferences at all, and the highest
individual preference change from pre to post-tests was a value of twelve. As for participants in
the treatment groups only three (out of forty-eight) did not change their preferences at all
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(dependent variable value of zero), while there were many participants with dependent variable
values in the teens and twenties, with the highest a twenty-six out of thirty (meaning this
participant nearly totally changed his/her preferences post-deliberation).
Next the model tests with analysis of variance in Table 2, using only the dependent
variable and the independent variables for H1. Within this data there are two areas of note: the Fvalue and the adjusted R-squared value. First, the F-value significance is at the .001 level,
Table 2: Hypothesis 1 Analysis of Variance
Source

Sum of

Degree of

Mean

Squares*

Freedom

Sum of

F-value

Squares
Model

1014

1

1014

Error

1909

94

20.31

Total

2923

95

30.77

*Adjusted R-squared = .34

49.93**

**P-value < .001

showing overwhelming significance for the model. Second, the R-squared value suggests that
over one-third of the effect on the dependent variable is because of the independent variable of
group condition. Table 2 shows statistically that the first hypothesis is significant—deliberation
does cause increased changes in agenda preferences. Therefore, the null hypothesis that
deliberating about agenda priorities will show that participants who participated in
deliberations do not have increased changes to their agenda preferences more than those who
did not participate in deliberations can be rejected with confidence.
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Finally, an analysis of covariance enters the alternative effects variable into the model to
test for added effect size.14 Table 3 shows the second model, which includes the alternative
variable discuss weekly in an analysis of covariance.15 The analysis of covariance shows that,
Table 3: Hypothesis 1 Analysis of Covariance
Source

Sum of

Degrees of

Mean Sum of

F-value

Squares

Freedom

Squares

Model

1213.32

2

606.66

33***

Condition

1066.21

1

1066.21

58***

Discuss

199.32

1

199.32

10.84**

Error

1709.64

93

18.38

Total

2922.96*

95

30.77

Weekly

*Adjusted R-squared = .40

**P-value < .01
***P-value < .001

when added to the original model, discuss weekly also represents a significant F-value, showing
that it too had some effect on the dependent variable.
Looking further into this finding, participants who pre-tested higher ratios of political
discussion per week were actually less likely to change their agenda preferences. 16 Figure 1
displays a two-way scatter plot as well as a regression line that visualizes the slope showing

14

All other control and demographic variables were tested using analysis of covariance, with only the discuss
weekly variable adding a significant effect to the model; therefore, all other control variables were dropped from the
model due to lack of significance.
15
There was no significant interaction effect found between condition and discuss weekly.
16
Correlation and regression tests both demonstrate that the discuss weekly variable had a negative correlation with
the dependent variable; as discuss weekly increased, the dependent variable value decreased.
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Figure 1: Discuss Weekly Impact on Overall Preference Change
agreement with low political discussion and high preference change. This finding corroborates
that, regardless of the condition variable, participants who discuss politics more were more likely
to have constrained preferences and therefore less likely to change their post-test rankings. This
alternative effect on the model attests to an earlier deliberative study which finds that
“individuals with high levels of prior political conversation…have more crystallized opinions
ready and waiting to be vocalized” (Dutwin 2003). This finding will be addressed later in the
Further Analysis section.
Hypothesis 2
Results of the H2 tests show significant results as well. Table 1 represents summary
statistics that initially verify the discrepancy between participant‟s pre and post preferences when
only considering those preferences brought up in deliberation. Immediately of note here is the
larger mean in the post-test group. This offers evidence in favor of H2 since the hypothesis
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Table 4: Hypothesis 2 Summary Statistics
Variable

Post-test

Mean

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

Deviation

value

value

11

3.135

-2

15

8.646

3.681

0

15

value
Pre-test
value

suggests that preference change will show increase in the post-test variable. Further analysis of
variance shown in Table 5 displays more in favor of H2. 17Here the data shows a significant Fvalue at the .001 level, offering overwhelming data to support the hypothesis. Within this data
there are two areas of note: the F-value and the adjusted R-squared value. First, the F-value
significance is at the .001 level, showing overwhelming significance for the model and
supporting that participants increased preference rankings in the direction of preferences
discussed in deliberations. Therefore, the null hypothesis that participants involved in
deliberation will rank the agenda preferences that were discussed in deliberation equally or
decreasingly less in their post-deliberation questionnaires than in their pre-deliberation
questionnaires can be rejected with confidence.
Further evidence from Figure 2 shows the increasing slope addressing the postdeliberative preferences that coincide with group discussion. Of interest in Figure 2 is the fact
that the slope does not intercept near the zero x-axis. The intercept is actually above 5, meaning

17

The same control variables listed in the first model were added to this model (including discuss weekly). None
displayed significant effects on the dependent variable, and did not change the significance of the primary results.
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Table 5: Hypothesis 2 Analysis of Variance
Source

Sum of

Degree of

Mean Sum

Squares*

Freedom

of Squares

Model

245

1

245

Error

245

46

5.326

Total

217

47

4.719

F-value

51.91**

*Adjusted R-squared = .52

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15

**P-value < .001
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Figure 2: Pre-Deliberation Impact on Post-Deliberation
that participants who had no preferences ranked which were discussed in deliberation would
have a predicted post-deliberation preference ranking value of above five. If the intercept were to
be at or below zero then we would be hard pressed to uphold the hypothesis based on a reverse
direction of participants values diverting away from preferences discussed in deliberation.
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Hypothesis 3
Results of the H3 tests show differing results according to the hypothesis. Table 6
regression statistics show no significant effect when measuring participant‟s openness to
Table 6: Hypothesis 3 Model 1 Regression
Source

Coefficient

Standard

95%

Error

Confidence

Prob > F

Interval
Model 1DV-

12.593

2.394

7.78

Overall

to

preference

17.41

.200**

ranking change*

IV-

-1.033

.794

-2.630

Process

to

openness

.565

*Adjusted R-squared = .0355

** not significant

deliberation on the overall preference ranking change variable (model 1). This suggests that
openness/constraint cannot be considered a predictor of overall preference ranking change.
Table 7 shows some significance when the regression describes only those preferences discussed
in deliberation (model 2).18 This discrepancy in findings accounts for the difference in the
dependent variables used in the model. Although they are similar, overall preference ranking

18

The same control variables listed in the first model were added to this model (including discuss weekly). None
displayed significant effects on the dependent variable, and did not change the significance of the primary results.
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change is not predicated on the process openness variable, while deliberated preference rank
change is.
Table 7: Hypothesis 3 Model 2 Regression
Source

Coefficient

Standard Error

95%

Prob > F

Confidence
Interval
Model 2 DV-

4.435

1.107

2.207

Deliberation

to

preference

6.662

.053**

ranking change*

IV-

-.729

.367

-1.467

Process

to

openness

.009

*Adjusted R-squared = .059

** significant at .10 level

The difference in these two variables is that those participants who remained open to the
deliberative process were more likely to change their preferences towards those preferences
discussed during deliberation. On the other hand, there is no significant data to show that
participants who were open to the deliberative process changed their overall preferences
increasingly more (or less) than those participants who remained constrained towards the
process. In this instance the hypothesis can be partially retained. Preference change increases
with openness to the deliberative process, but the change is only significant when considering
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those preferences discussed during deliberation. In this case, there remains the possibility of
persuasion based of those constrained participants.
Further Analysis
A further question concerning the third hypothesis is whether those issues discussed
during deliberation are increasingly from those participants who are more constrained
participants. In other words, are the issues being discussed during deliberation trend toward those
of the constrained participants? Any significant finding here would suggest that constrained
participants preferences are being discussed more. This may be the case, as Dutwin found that
constrained individuals “have crystallized opinions ready and waiting to be vocalized” (2003,
258). But, if group cohesiveness is a result of the lack of divisive rules (debate and consensus),
then there should be no significant difference to show. A simple regression using process
openness as an independent variable and pre-test value as the dependent variable found no
significant results to back this assertion up. 19
Another aspect of this question is whether those same constrained participants determine
the direction of preference change. In other words, are the constrained participants persuading
others in the group towards their preferences (Barabas 2004; Sanders 1997)? Results here should
indicate significance if Barabas is correct. But, similar to the previous question, because the rules
support group cohesiveness, there should be no significant results found. Similar to the previous
finding, a simple regression using process openness as an independent variable and post-test
value as the dependent variable found no significant results to support this assertion. 20
One finding of note that was produced from the H1 model is that participants who
discussed politics more on a weekly basis also were less likely to change their agenda

19
20

Probability > F = .466
Probability > F = .352
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preferences. This finding is in keeping with an earlier study which demonstrates that high levels
of political communication constrain a person‟s beliefs (Dutwin 2003). Dutwin found that
political conversation plays a large role in influencing others during deliberation, eliciting an
interesting question in this specific study—if participants who discuss politics more are less
likely to change their preferences, then are the participants that are open to the deliberative
process (found in the second H3 model) likely to change their preferences towards those who
often discuss politics or display superior rhetorical skills?
A task of coding such a hypothesis would unquestionably be daunting and tedious, but it
is worth the effort to look at this proposition in a qualitative manner. First, there seem to be two
questions here: (1) Do those constrained participants who discuss politics more often tend to
control the deliberation with their preferences? (2) Are others who are less constrained and
therefore more open to the deliberative process more likely to follow the persuasion from those
less constrained?
It would seem inherent that participants who discussed politics more on a weekly basis
would show some statistical significance when calculating how many of their pre-deliberation
preference rankings were actually discussed. Actually, a simple regression using the predeliberation value as the dependent variable and discuss weekly as the independent variable
shows no significance in any direction and no reliable causal statistic.21 So what exactly is going
on here?
It would be relevant to this analysis to examine in-depth a specific example from the
deliberative groups. This example is from group three, which was a smaller group of seven
participants. This group stood apart from the others for several reasons: (1) four of the
participants ranked in the top six of all treatment group participants with regards to deliberation
21

Probability > F = .64
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preference ranking change; in other words, they changes their preferences according to what was
discussed in deliberation; (2) both participants with the lowest preference change and the highest
preference change were included in this group; (3) there were only four preferences discussed in
this group (the fewest of any group); (4) this group was randomly comprised (as were all
groups), but consisted of no participants who describing themselves as democrats or liberals on
any scale.22 The four preferences discussed in this group were: education, terrorism/national
defense, social security, and ethics reform.
Further analysis of group three reveals that those participants who gained the most from
the deliberation (based on the process openness variable) changed their preferences to fit the
discussion. But, it was precisely these three participants who spoke little or none at all, even
when given the opportunity. The other four participants dominated the discussion, voicing their
preferences clearly and often agreeing with each other. The two participants with the least
amount of political discussion weekly eventually agreed with the deliberated preferences in their
post-rankings.
There seemed to be a few overriding themes that lead to this group representing the
highest as well as the lowest preference changes as the other five. The group was small; and
comprised of fairly similar belief structures—evident during the deliberation and within the data
analysis (ideology and party identification). Also, certain participants were both open to the
deliberative process and yet lacked much experience with political discussion (discuss weekly),
and generally failed to assert their preferences in the deliberation. The two participants who best
fit this mold both listed health care as their number one priority, yet discussion or mention of this
never occurred. One dismissed its importance totally by not ranking it in the post-deliberation
test, while the other lowered the health care ranking to fourth on their list.
22

This according to questions 2 & 3 found in Appendix A
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Finally, the participants who did the largest amount of speaking were articulate, discussed
politics on a regular basis, and seemed comfortable with the group similarities. One participant
articulated his preference for social security agenda convincingly: “Social security is like the
third rail of politics...like the third rail on a train track...you don‟t touch that.” His descriptive
explanation of his fifth most important preference didn‟t bring about him changing this ranking
post-deliberation, but it did influence two others to rank social security as their number one
preferences post-deliberation (where it had previously not been ranked by either).
Findings from Dutwin (2003) and this experiment suggest that participants who discuss
politics on a regular basis have constrained preferences. There seems to be several reasons found
within this deliberative experiment that should be considered causes for this constraint:
participants who discuss politics frequently do so with others who have similar beliefs;
participants who discuss politics frequently have already deliberated and articulated their
preferences with others, and are more aware of what these preferences are; participants who
discuss politics frequently may be more knowledgeable and persuasive when discussing their
preferences (Barabas 2004).
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CONCLUSION
D. M. Ryfe presented four mechanisms for successful deliberations: (1) a set of rules to
abide by; (2) involves culture and personal experience when discussions are framed; (3) proper
information and leadership when organizing and producing the deliberation; (4) people must
believe that the deliberative process has valuable meaning in order to become motivated about
the process (2005, 63-64). Given this criteria, these agenda preference deliberations have
succeeded. Clear rules for the participants and moderator were upheld, including no policy
alternative debate and no required consensus. In certain analysis, the lack of debate or consensus
afforded group cohesiveness. Secondly, a successful moderator goal was to generate discussion
from participant‟s personal experiences. Also, all deliberation rules were maintained. Thirdly,
informational requirements were not necessary due to the nature of the deliberations. Finally, it
has been concluded that participants who were open to the deliberation used the process to reconsider their preferences.
Deliberative democracy can further use this pilot experiment to begin involving the
public more in the agenda process. Specifically, similar experiments should be created that not
only investigate more individual variables within such deliberations, but offer aggregate result
that are meant to inform policymakers, political campaigns, and the media on various levels
(Ryfe 2005). As stated earlier, such deliberations can substantially leave behind a long list of
problematic concerns that easily arise within policy outcome deliberations: informational
requirements (Zaller 1992), motivational deficits (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002),
apprehension towards confrontation (Rosenburg 2007; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), rational
and rhetorical capabilities (Sanders 1997), emotional affect (Rosenburg 2007), limitations of
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consensus (Rosenburg 2007; Ryfe 2005), and divisiveness caused by debate (Knight and
Johnson 1994). This experiment and research has proven this.
There are benefits for deliberative researchers, the public, policymakers, political
campaigns, the media, and democracy itself for utilizing agenda preference deliberations: they
can serve as a better starting point and produce better results than policy alternative
deliberations; they can provide a new outlet for a public voice in the government agenda; they
can help to legitimize the agenda setting process by informing elected officials, political
campaigns, and the media what issues the public would prefer to be on the government agenda.
Such deliberations assure that policymakers and political campaigns have better means
for direct public input into what issues policymakers should be addressing, and the public would
take better notice when government agendas and policymaking strayed away from these agenda
guidelines. Such deliberations offer policymakers a different perspective than opinion polls and
votes based on campaign debates which, more often than not, consider pre-determined issue
priorities and policy alternatives. Agenda preference deliberations show the government what the
public views as top priorities after careful consideration and deliberation of all agenda
possibilities. Such deliberations can give added legitimacy to American democracy.
There are still areas left open from this study to be addressed in the near future. Research
should look further to determine what individual characteristics are most common within
participants who are highly open or highly contemptuous towards the deliberative process.
Determining how differing levels of political discussion in participants affects the individual
participant, other participants, and the group overall would benefit deliberative research as well.
Also, to what extent are characteristics of refined rhetoric, political sophistication, and prior
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political discussion used to persuade other participants; and, are such participants themselves
constrained towards the deliberative process?
Future studies could also look into the effect of internal deliberation on agenda
preference change. It could be said that a portion of the change in the control groups who didn‟t
experience deliberation actually altered their post-test preferences because they were offered the
chance to re-think their opinions and re-establish their agenda preferences. How much of this
change is a matter of simple memory lapse or volatile preferences, and how much is a matter of
internal deliberation that results in actual preference restructuring?
Additionally, this deliberative model could be used by others as a mechanism to use prior
to policy alternative deliberations: that preference collaboration without debate can lead to group
cohesiveness and motivation, as participants realize that they were the ones generating the
deliberation issues—not some unknown or outside source.
But, perhaps the most important area left to discover by this research is to actually
construct public agenda deliberations that speak to all government levels and serve the purpose
of informing officials, politicians, and the media of the public‟s agenda preferences. This is the
most important reason for conducting this experiment. It represents a pilot study on the benefits
of agenda preference deliberations, and is meant to offer deliberative democracy research a fresh
substitute to policy alternative deliberations.
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APPENDIX A: PRE AND POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRES
Pre-Test
1. Please list, in order of your preference, what items you believe should be the top priority
items of our national government's policymakers in 2010. (1 through 5 listing, fill-in-theblack)
2. I consider myself to be a: (1, Republican; 2, Democrat; 3, Independent; 4, Something
Else)
3. I consider myself to be a: (1, Strong Conservative; 1, Moderate Conservative; 3, Neither;
4, Moderate Liberal; 5, Strong Liberal)
4. I vote in political elections: (1, Always; 2, Often; 3, Sometimes; 4, Not very often; 5, Not
at all)
5. I participate in political activities, such as attending campaign events, volunteering in a
campaign, writing letters to elected officials, displaying a politician's yard sign or bumper
sticker, donating money to campaigns, or other forms of political activity: (1, Often; 2,
Sometimes; 3, Not very often; 4, Never)
6.

My interest in politics is: (1, Very interested; 2, Somewhat interested; 3, Not very
interested; 4, Not at all interested)

7. I discuss politics with others: (1, Often; 2, Sometimes; 3, Not very often; 4, Not at all)
8. During a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family or friends?
(fill-in-the-blank)
9. What is your age? (fill-in-the-blank)
10. What gender are you? (fill-in-the-blank)
11. What is your race/ethnicity? (fill-in-the-blank)
Post-Test
1. Please list, in order of your preference, what items you believe should be the top priority
items of our national government's policymakers in 2010. (1 through 5 listing, fill-in-theblack)
2.

Has participating in this experimental process changed your views about the
government's agenda? (1, Yes, very much so; 2, Yes, somewhat; 3, Yes, but very little; 4,
No)
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APPENDIX B: DELIBERATION—MODERATOR AND
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions to Participants
1. Open up the deliberation by asking participants to discuss what they consider should be
the government‟s top priorities in 2010.
2.

Explain that the deliberation is not a debate concerning issue or policy alternatives or
outcomes. (If such occurs, immediately remind the participant/s that the discussion
involves the government agenda and not policy alternatives. Debate concerning the
importance of issues or agendas is acceptable.)

3. Explain that everyone has an equal opportunity to speak their preferences. (The
moderator will maintain that participants do not take over the deliberation by speaking
too long.)
Moderator Instructions
1. There is no requirement of consensus. Therefore, the moderator will at no point ask for
group agreement or preference ranking order at any point. If the group decides to come to
some agreement or consensus, this is acceptable provided the moderator did not induce
this consensus.
2. There is no time limit for deliberation. The moderator should conduct the deliberation as
long as participants are discussing their preferences.

3. The moderator should look for deliberations to progress into three areas:
A. Preferences that may be perceived as being of similar importance to the group, as
well as the general public.
B. Preferences that may be have been overlooked by individuals, the group, the
public, or the government.
C. Preferences that are specifically important to individuals because of personal
experience.
If the deliberation hasn‟t evolved into each of these areas to some extent, the moderator
should progress the deliberation by asking the group to question and discuss any of the
three above areas that have not been addressed.
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APPENDIX C: AGGREGATE AGENDA PREFERENCE
RESULTS (POST-TEST)
Table 8: Treatment versus Control Group Aggregate Preferences (Top Ten)*

Treatment Group Preferences

Ranking
Values Control Group Preferences

Ranking
Values

education

119

health care/insurance

129

health care/health insurance

105

military/war/defense/security/terrorism

128

military/war/defense/security/terrorism

101

economy/recession

101

economy

101

education

76

taxes/debt/financial reform

93

62

jobs/unemployment
foreign relations/policy/aid/affairs/
international relations

31

taxes/debt/budget
foreign relations/aid/affairs/policy/
international relations

31

jobs/unemployment

21

social security

29

social security

19

energy/gas prices

19

19

immigration/border control

15

abortion
civil rights/gay rights/
women's rights/equality

47

18

* Values are calculated using the post-test scale of the H1 dependent variable (highest ranks are
scored as five, whereas lowest ranks are scored as one).
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